Introduction
In [13] Moschovakis presents a topological model, over Baire space, for a system of intuitionistic analysis that includes relativized dependent choice, monotone bar induction (verified in [2, pp. 13-14] ), Kripke's schema, and the restriction of Brouwer's principle for numbers to predicates without free choice-sequence parameters. Following Krol [12] , one may describe this model roughly1 as follows. Unfortunately, the unrestricted version of Brouwer's principle for numbers fails in the model. This failure prevents the model from being a completely reliable guide to intuitionistic mathematics: one may show, for example, that although intuitionistically correct for the real numbers, is not true in the model. While it still remains very useful in the study of intuitionism, a model of the unrestricted form of Brouwer's principle would, of course, be desirable.
This last example is a real-algebraic instance of a theorem by Krol [9] , who shows that if one replaces mm by any T,-space T and builds a Moschovakis-type model over T, the unrestricted version of Brouwer's principle fails as long as
113~ <&x> = O)ll = T -{t>
for some E and some f E T. So to obtain a model for the unrestricted version of Brouwer's principle, one must either shrink the universe of choice sequences--so that no available 5 is connected to a single t E T as above--or get rid of the points t, and build models over complete Heyting algebras that are not algebras of open subsets of a T,-space. Krol eventually followed the first alternative, and found a submodel of Moschovakis' model' that verified Brouwer's principle [12] and lent itself to further metamathematical investigations [ 10, 111.
One may, however, follow the second alternative to obtain a model for Brouwer's principle. To get rid of the points of "w, one should change the algebra of truth values by identifying wo with Ow -{p} for all p E Oo. Starting from a 'sober topological space' [6, p. 3351, Fourman and Scott make such identifications to produce a complete Heyting algebra with 'no points' [6, p. 3371 . If one starts with a space X that is Tl as well as sober, the cHa S(X) produced by Fourman and Scott is the cHa of coperfect open subsets of X: i.e., open subsets of X whose complements are perfect closed subsets of X. Given S(Oo), one may follow Moschovakis's procedure to define a structure for the language of [B] supplemented by choice-sequence constants. Choice sequences are represented by maps E : w x CO + S( OOJ) such that V @m, n) = Oo and Qm, n) A 5(m, p) = fl (I)' n for all m, IZ, p with it #p (here and below, A, V, A, v and $ will stand for the cHa operations of S(Oo)). Atomic sentences receive truth values just as before, and the inductive definition of l(All for logically complex A simply replaces the *The truth-value algebra of Krol's model is actually 0(("2), but one could replace "'w by "2 in the definition of Moschovakis's model without changing anything in the present discussion. IIVa W4ll = Q llw9ll~ Il~aW4ll = y ll~(~Nl.
A holds in the model just in case IlAll = oco. The unrestricted form of Brouwer's principle for numbers, relativized dependent choice, monotone bar induction, and Kripke's schema all hold in this model, and from these principles other interesting ones follow: for example, the uniformity principle [l] and certain topologically restricted forms of Brouwer's principle for functions [19, 20] . Although these statements also hold in Krol's model, I have found the present model much easier to understand and to manipulate.
Section. 1 presents the formal theory to be verified in the model, as well as some of its consequences. Section 2 describes the model in more detail, and states a basic result on the evaluation of terms and functors. Section 3 proves useful lemmas concerning the cHa S(Oo) and the calculation of truth values. And Sections 4 and 5 show that the theory of Section 1 holds in the model. The Conclusion, finally, raises questions about possible applications of the model.
The notations regarding the formal theory of Section 1 come from [8] , which the reader should have close at hand. Any non-standard notations or notions will be explained when introduced.
The theory
The theory Y to be studied below is written essentially in the language of [8, Sections 3-51, although Section 2 below adds choice-sequence constants and makes a few minor changes. Thus there are two sorts of variables-x, y, z, . . . ranging over natural numbers, and a, p, y, . . . ranging over choice sequencesand there are symbols for zero and for certain primitive-recursive functions (see [8, 4.2-4.3, 5.51 ). Y starts, as does the theory of [8] , with the two-sorted intuitionistic predicate calculus [8, p. where A does not contain LY free. All of the formulae displayed may contain free choice-sequence parameters.
The basic axioms, together with RDC, BIM, and WC-N, imply Brouwer's principle for numbers [7, [6, pp. 326 , 3371, the map F : S( Ow)+ S( "w) given for U E Q( Oo) by F(U) = complement of perfect kernel of -0 -U is a cHa-morphism [6, p. 3181. A, V, A, v, and + will be used for the cHa operations in Q"w), while G will be used for the natural partial ordering on S(wo) (although G is E 1 (S(wo) X S("w))).
A (t1 + t&n) = v GI) A M&); n,+?l*=n (iii) t', tl -&, t:', t!, pd(t), Cl z t2, q(t), sg(t), rm(tI, f2), [fl/f2] , and pt are handled much as tI + f2 is; Although one must use an appropriate measure of complexity for terms and functors, the proofs present no real difficulties and will be omitted.
Preliminary results on the model
To show that the theory of Section 1 is true in the model of Section 2, one must exploit certain facts to be proved in this section. The first result finds a substitute for the points eliminated by F of Section 2. In what follows a tree will be a function T : (J E '"2 I+ to cc0 w such that (i) if u c r, then t, c t, (ii) if CT and r are incomparable, then to and tv are incomparable for all a, r E '"2; T, T', . . . will be trees.
[T] is the set of all points in mm having arbitrarily long finite initial segments in ran T; [T] is always a perfect closed set. Let for u E <o~. If U E C7( Ow), U contains a tree T just in case B, c U, while T belongs to U-T E U-just in case [T] f~ U f 0. Given these definitions, one may state
Lemma 2. Zf U, V E O("o), then F(U) =z F(V) iff VT (T E U-* T E V).
Proof. The definition of 'belongs to' implies that
V~(~~~~~~V)
iff V~(~~~nV=0~~~~n~=0).
Because every [T] is a perfect closed set, the definition of F implies that
One clearly can infer the right-hand side of (*) from
But the right-hand side of (*) also implies this condition: because W. -F(V) is a perfect closed set, one may easily show that any p E @w -F(V) belongs to [T} for some T with [T) fl F(V) = 0. Thus
The remaining results of this section concern the truth values of quantified statements. First, existential quantifiers: 
Verification of 3 -{RDC, BIm, WC-N, KS} in the model
The next two sections will show that every closed instance, in the expanded language, of an axiom of 5 is true in the model, and that the rules of inference preserve truth: that is, if AI, . . . , A,/B is an application of a rule of inference, and every closed instance of each Ai holds in the model, then every closed instance of B holds in the model. The present section will concentrate on the basic arithmetical axioms and rules of inference, and where possible I will use the names of [8] to refer to these axioms and rules. Once the axioms and rules of the two-sorted intuitionistic predicate calculus are verified, one can show that every closed instance of an axiom is true by showing that the universal closure of the axiom is true; this fact will be exploited without fanfare in what follows. 1-7, g', 9N, 9F, 12N, and 12F are true in the model, or preserve truth in the model, because S(Ow) is a cHa. Thus 1OF is also true in the model. whenever m < n are successive primes. Because every consequence of the theory must hold in the model, "18.1 and "18.2 hold in it.
Verification of RDC, BIm, WC-N, and KS in the model
This section will show that T's remaining axioms hold in the model. The results of Section 4 allow one to exploit [8, 04- and suppose that U # llA(l)ll. L emma 2 provides a tree T, contained in U, that does not belong to llA( 1) 11. The argument below will provide collections {T"}aecoz of trees, and {n 0 ,+"* of finite sequences of natural numbers, with the } following properties:
(1) tg^' = t?i); Given such collections, one may define a tree T" by the condition tg = t;.
One may also define a choice sequence E obeying for if &m, n) is defined, for all m < lh u = k and all II, so that (6) Lemma 6 thus provides a tree Tz and a choice sequence y. that satisfy condition (2) .
Suppose now that for some m 3 0, yo, . . . , y,,, obey (1) and (2) ._One obtains a yM+r obeying these conditions as follows. Since T $ I(3x, y V/3 (c(y) = p(y)+ A@, x))ll, Lemma 4 implies that T 4 IIVP <&Cm + 1)') = I%@ + l)')-+NB, h)ll for all 1 <rn + 1. If u E "+l2 and 1 s m + 1, Lemma 6 provides a tree T',, contained in Br,.++,_,, and a choice sequence yDsr such that T',e II&k + 1)') = ?&Cm + ~)')+A(?,,I, bll. Having shown that every closed instance, in the expanded language, of an axiom of F is true in the model, and that F's rules of inference preserve truth in the model, one may conclude that every closed instance of a theorem of F is true in the model.
Conclusion
In [lo] Krol builds from his model a realizability notion allowing him to prove the disjunction and existence properties for (F -{RDC}) U {"2.1}, and the proof presumably works for F as well. I have not yet found an analogue of Krol's argument that starts from the model of Section 2 instead. Van Dalen has invented a model-theoretic argument, using a 'glueing operation' [3] , that yields the disjunction and existence properties for where (Y is not free in A [ll] . To show that the present model is as useful as Krol's, one should thus either adapt his realizability notions to the present model or use it in a new way to distinguish between the strong and weak forms of Kripke's schema. Yet even if Krol's model produces some results that the present model does not, its simpler truth definition may permit a more detailed study of its theory. Recent work on intuitionistic real algebra [19, 201 was inspired by the study of the theory of Scott's model for the reals , and this theory is interpretable in the theory of Moschovakis's model [13, pp. 273-41 . If one can find a relatively simple structure related to the present model as Scott's is related to Moschovakis's, one may learn more about intuitionistic real algebra: for an example cited in the Introduction shows that the theory of Scott's model is not always intuitionistically correct. The search for this structure should start with the representation theorem for R given in [5, pp. 282-41, but one would hope that special properties of S("w) would simplify the structure presented there.
To say that each model seems especially suited to certain investigations does not settle the exact relations between the models. One might try to compare them by studying the inverse image [6, p. 3731 , under the obvious map from 0("2) into S("2) = S("w), of Krol's model, but I do not know how this new S(wo)-structure would compare with the model of Section 2.
